THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF WIPO’S
BROADCASTING TREATY: THE ORIGINALITY
AND LIMITED TIMES REQUIREMENTS OF THE
COPYRIGHT CLAUSE
ADAM R. TAROSKY 1

ABSTRACT
Because the proposed WIPO Broadcasting Treaty extends
perpetual copyright-like protections to unoriginal information, its
implementation would violate at least two fundamental limitations
on Congress’s Copyright Clause power: the originality and
“limited times” requirements. But Congress has a trump card—the
Commerce Clause. This iBrief argues that to give proper effect to
the limitations of the Copyright Clause, Congress should not be
allowed to implement copyright-like legislation under the less
restrictive Commerce Clause.

INTRODUCTION
¶1
“To what purpose are powers limited, and to what purpose is that
limitation committed to writing, if these limits may, at any time, be passed
by those intended to be restrained?” 2
¶2
Since its first meeting in November 1998, the World Intellectual
Property Organization’s Standing Committee on Copyright Related Rights
(“SCCR”) has been considering a new form of copyright-like protection for
broadcasting organizations. 3 The SCCR has developed a bundle of
“broadcasting rights” now consolidated in a second draft Treaty on the
Protection of Broadcasting Organizations (“Broadcasting Treaty”).4 Among

1

J.D./LL.M. candidate, 2007, Duke University School of Law; B.A. in Political
Science and Broadcast Journalism, 2004, The Pennsylvania State University
Schreyer Honors College.
2
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 176 (1803).
3
World Intellectual Property Organization [WIPO], Standing Committee on
Copyright and Related Rights, Consolidated Text for a Treaty on the Protection
of Broadcasting Organizations, Introductory Notes 1, SCCR/11/3, (Feb. 29,
2004), available at
http://www.wipo.int/documents/en/meetings/2004/sccr/pdf/sccr_11_3.pdf
[hereinafter SCCR/11/3].
4
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Consolidated Text for a Treaty on the Protection of Broadcasting Organizations,
SCCR/12/2 (Rev. 2), (May 2, 2005), available at
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the exclusive rights secured to broadcasting organizations by the proposed
Treaty are the rights to authorize retransmission of a broadcast, 5
transmission of a broadcast to the public, 6 fixation of a broadcast, 7
reproduction of a broadcast, 8 and distribution and dissemination of a
broadcast. 9 Broadcasting organizations will enjoy these exclusive rights for
a period of “at least” fifty years following their broadcasts. 10
¶3
As currently written, the Broadcasting Treaty would likely be
unconstitutional as exceeding Congress’s Article I, Section 8 powers if
implemented into U.S. law. First, the Broadcasting Treaty would grant
copyright-like protections to unoriginal broadcast “signals” in violation of
the originality requirement of the Copyright Clause. 11 Second, by
extending what can be construed as perpetual copyright-like “broadcasting
rights,” the Treaty violates the “limited times” requirement of the Copyright
Clause. 12 While the Treaty could theoretically be implemented under the
less restrictive Commerce Clause, this iBrief argues that Congress should
not be able to circumvent express limitations of the Copyright Clause by
invoking its commerce authority.
¶4
The iBrief begins by examining congressional power to enact
“copyright-like” legislation under the Copyright Clause. It then considers
congressional authority to enact this legislation under the Commerce
Clause. Finally, it concludes with a discussion of the relationship between
the two clauses and the implications of the relationship for the
constitutionality of the Broadcasting Treaty.

http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/sccr/en/sccr_12/sccr_12_2_rev_2.doc
[hereinafter SCCR/12/2 (Rev. 2)].
5
Id. art. 6.
6
Id. art. 7.
7
Id. art. 8.
8
Id. art. 9.
9
Id. arts. 10–12; cf. United States Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 106–106A
(2000).
10
SCCR/12/2 (Rev. 2), supra note 4, art. 15.
11
SCCR/12/2 (Rev. 2), supra note 4, art. 3.
12
Id. art. 15; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. This iBrief focuses exclusively on the
originality and “limited times” problems with the Broadcasting Treaty.
However, there are other potential constitutional infirmities in the Treaty. For a
good summary of other potential problems, see Top 10 Reasons to Reject the
WIPO Committee Chairman’s Consolidated Text for a Broadcasting Treaty,
http://www.ipjustice.org/WIPO/top10reasons.shtml (last visited Mar. 27, 2006)
[hereinafter Top 10], and James Boyle, “James Boyle’s Predictions in
Technology Law and Policy for 2006,” DUKE L. & TECH. REV. iBlawg,
http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/dltr/iblawg/?p=16 (Feb. 15, 2006).
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I. THE BROADCASTING TREATY AND THE COPYRIGHT CLAUSE
¶5
The Copyright Clause of the United States Constitution is “both a
grant of power and a limitation.” 13 When forming the Clause, the Framers
struck a delicate balance between unrestricted competition and creation
incentivised through state-granted monopolies. 14 To protect this balance,
the Clause assures that copyrights cover only original material and last for
finite periods of time. 15

A. The originality requirement of the Copyright Clause is a
fundamental limitation on Congress’s power to legislate under the
Clause.
¶6
The Copyright Clause grants to Congress the power to “promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors . . . the exclusive Right to their respective Writings.” 16 The U.S.
Supreme Court has interpreted the words “authors” and “writings” in the
clause to require a degree of originality before copyright protection may
attach. 17 In Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., the
Court rejected the “sweat of the brow” theory that copyright protection was
justified by effort alone 18 and held, “Originality remains the sine qua non of
copyright; accordingly, copyright protection may extend only to those
components of a work that are original to the author.” 19
¶7
While the Court made the originality hurdle a low one—requiring
only independent creation by the author and some minimal level of
creativity 20 —it nonetheless considered the requirement constitutionally
mandated. 21 Thus, copyright protection cannot be extended to cover works
lacking at least a modicum of originality. 22

13

Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 212 (2003) (quoting Graham v. John Deere
Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1966) (emphasis added)).
14
See Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1966).
15
James Boyle, “Constitutional Circumvention,” FT.COM,
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/fa07af4a-fadc-11da-b4d0-0000779e2340.html (June
13, 2006).
16
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
17
Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991).
18
Id. at 359–60.
19
Id. at 348.
20
Id. at 345.
21
Id. at 346.
22
Id.
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B. The “limited times” provision of the Copyright Clause is a
fundamental limitation on Congress’s power to legislate under the
Clause.
¶8
In addition to requiring originality, the Copyright Clause mandates
that copyrights be granted only for “limited time[s].” 23 The “limited times”
provision was the subject of a recent Supreme Court decision on the
constitutionality of the federal Copyright Term Extension Act (“CTEA”). 24
In Eldred v. Ashcroft, the petitioners (whose businesses relied on formerly
copyrighted works that had passed into the public domain) argued that the
CTEA created perpetual copyright protection by retrospectively extending
the term of existing copyrights from the life of the author plus fifty years to
the life of the author plus seventy years. 25 If Congress could extend the
duration of existing copyrights, the petitioners argued, Congress could
effectively create a perpetual right through successive term extensions. 26
While the Court held that the CTEA should not be construed as creating
perpetual copyrights because of a long history of similar copyright
extensions, 27 it nonetheless recognized that the “limited times” language of
the Copyright Clause imposed an express limitation on Congress’s ability to
grant copyrights. 28
¶9
Since Eldred, several U.S. courts have likewise viewed the “limited
times” portion of the Copyright Clause as a limitation on congressional
power. 29 In particular, a line of cases has developed interpreting the
constitutionality of federal “anti-bootlegging” statutes passed by Congress
to implement provisions of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS Agreement”). 30 The statutes impose
both civil 31 and criminal 32 penalties on anyone who makes unauthorized
recordings of live musical performances, or who transmits, distributes, sells,
rents, or traffics in such recordings. Crucially, these protections have no

23

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
17 U.S.C. § 302 (2000); Eldred, 537 U.S. at 192–93.
25
Eldred, 537 U.S. at 193.
26
Id. at 208.
27
Id. at 209–10.
28
Id.
29
See United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1274 n.9 (11th Cir. 1999);
Kiss Catalog v. Passport Int’l Prods. (Kiss II), 450 F. Supp. 2d 1169, 1176 (C.D.
Cal. 2005); United States v. Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d 413, 422–23 (S.D.N.Y.
2004); Kiss Catalog v. Passport Int’l Prods. (Kiss I), 350 F. Supp. 2d 823, 832–
33 (C.D. Cal. 2004).
30
See Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1272 (explaining history of anti-bootlegging
laws); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2319A (implementing TRIPS).
31
17 U.S.C. § 1101 (2000).
32
18 U.S.C. § 2319A (2000).
24
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time limit and apparently last into perpetuity. 33 Consequently, critics have
challenged the anti-bootlegging statutes as running afoul of the Copyright
Clause’s “limited times” requirement. 34
In 1999, the Eleventh Circuit first recognized that “the antibootlegging statute may be faced with . . . constitutional problem[s] under
the Copyright Clause,” because “the protection afforded to live performance
. . . contains no express time limitation and would arguably persist
indefinitely.” 35 While the court did not decide the Copyright Clause issue
because the argument was raised only in a footnote, two subsequent district
court decisions definitively held the anti-bootlegging statutes
unconstitutional as violating the “limited times” requirement. 36
¶10

¶11
First, in United States v. Martignon, the District Court for the
Southern District of New York held, “It is undeniable that the antibootlegging statute grants seemingly perpetual protection to live musical
performances, and therefore would run afoul of the Copyright Clause.” 37
Shortly thereafter, in Kiss Catalog v. Passport International Productions
(“Kiss I”), the District Court for the Central District of California held that
the civil version of the anti-bootlegging statute “creates perpetual copyrightlike protection in violation of the ‘for limited times’ restriction of the
Copyright Clause.” 38 Taken together, these cases support the conclusion
that laws granting perpetual copyright-like protections cannot be sustained
under the Copyright Clause.

C. The Broadcasting Treaty unconstitutionally creates copyright-like
rights over unoriginal information that can last into perpetuity.
Like the rights granted by the anti-bootlegging statutes, the rights
granted under the current draft of the Broadcasting Treaty are copyrightlike. Closely mirroring the substantive protections in the Copyright Act, the
rights in the Broadcasting Treaty include the exclusive rights of fixation
(art. 8), transmission (arts. 6, 11), distribution (arts. 7, 10, 12), and
reproduction (art. 9) of broadcasts. 39 In fact, the WIPO committee
¶12

33

Moghadam, 175 F. 3d at 1274 n. 9; 18 U.S.C. § 2319A.
See, e.g., Moghadam, 175 F. 3d at 1274 n.9.
35
Id.
36
United States v. Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d 413, 424 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); Kiss
Catalog v. Passport Int’l Prods. (Kiss I), 350 F. Supp. 2d 823, 833 (C.D. Cal.
2004).
37
Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 424.
38
Kiss I, 350 F. Supp. 2d at 833.
39
SCCR/12/2 (Rev. 2), supra note 4. Compare these rights to those reserved to
copyright holders in the U.S. Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 106–106A (2000),
including the exclusive rights of a copyright holder to reproduce, distribute,
perform, display and transmit their work.
34
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responsible for drafting the Treaty is tellingly named the “Standing
Committee on Copyright and Related Rights.” 40 There can be little doubt
that the Broadcasting Treaty is meant to confer upon broadcasters a right
closely analogous to a copyright. Thus, the natural place to find
congressional authority to implement the Treaty is the Copyright Clause.
However, for at least two reasons, the Broadcasting Treaty cannot be
implemented under this clause.
1.

The broadcasting rights cover unoriginal broadcast signals.
First, the Broadcasting Treaty would grant copyright-like protection
to unoriginal information in violation of the express mandate of Feist. 41
While a number of courts have recognized that some broadcasts are
sufficiently original for copyright protection because of the creativity in the
selection and arrangement of camera shots, 42 the broadcasting rights do not
attach to the broadcast’s content. 43 Instead, they attach only to broadcast
“signals.” 44 While this may be too obvious to state, it is hard to imagine
what originality could subsist in the creation of electronic “signals.” 45
¶13

For example, consider the broadcast of “The Little Mermaid,” 46 a
work already covered by an existing U.S. copyright held by Disney. A
broadcaster, say ABC Family, could get Disney’s permission to broadcast
the movie, and in broadcasting it, gain its own additional right over Ariel
and her aquatic entourage. ABC’s efforts here would fall short of the
“independent creation” and “minimal creativity” tests of Feist. 47 ABC did
not create Ariel, Sebastian, Ursula, or Prince Eric—Disney did. Moreover,
“once published, a work is no longer original.” 48 The only thing ABC can
claim to have independently created is a “signal,” which surely does not
possess even a minimal degree of creativity. While creating this signal may
have required effort, effort alone does not merit protection. 49 And yet, the
¶14

40

SCCR/12/2 (Rev. 2), supra note 4, Introduction (emphasis added).
Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991); see also
supra Section I.A.
42
E.g., Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, 105 F.3d 841, 847 (2d Cir. 1997).
43
SCCR/12/2 (Rev. 2), supra note 4, art. 3(0) (“The protection granted under
this Treaty extends only to signals used for the transmissions by the
beneficiaries of the protection of this Treaty, and not to works and other
protected subject matter carried by such signals.” (emphasis added)).
44
Id.
45
See Top 10, supra note 12 (noting the Broadcasting Treaty “grants copyright
protection over ‘signals,’ something that is neither creative nor original and
outside the scope of copyright protection”).
46
THE LITTLE MERMAID (Walt Disney Pictures 1989).
47
Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991)
48
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 211 (2003).
49
Feist, 499 U.S. at 359–60.
41
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Broadcasting Treaty would grant ABC exclusive copyright-like rights over
its quite un-extraordinary signal.
¶15
In the case of an already-copyrighted work like “The Little
Mermaid,” this additional right does not seem overly troubling in practice.
The right would require only one additional step from someone wishing to
use ABC’s broadcast of the film. 50 Instead of getting permission from
Disney only, as would be required under the current regime, the subsequent
user would also need permission from ABC. Yet even if this additional
layer of protection might seem insignificant in practice, its constitutional
significance is another matter. Granting a copyright-like right over plainly
unoriginal information runs directly counter to the Copyright Clause’s
originality requirement. Because of this requirement, the Broadcasting
Treaty cannot be implemented under the Copyright Clause.

2.

The broadcasting rights can last indefinitely.
¶16
Second, like the anti-bootlegging rights, the broadcasting rights
arguably last into perpetuity. While Article 15 of the Broadcasting Treaty
implies that countries will impose a term limit for protection, the provision
is inadequate. It reads, “The term of protection to be granted to
broadcasting organizations under this Treaty shall last, at least, until the end
of a period of 50 years computed from the end of the year in which the
broadcasting took place.” 51 The problem is that the provision is easily
circumvented. When a broadcasting organization finds its protections on a
certain broadcast are about to expire, it can simply rebroadcast the segment
and obtain another fifty years of protection. 52 Such action by broadcasters
will effectively lock up the content of the broadcast indefinitely. Indeed,
even if it were possible to distinguish between original and rebroadcasts, the
difficulty of making the distinction will lead many to err on the side of
caution and treat the work as broadcast-right protected. 53
¶17
It appears the drafting parties recognized this potential loophole as
the majority of draft proposals suggested that the term of protection begin
when the broadcast took place “for the first time.” 54 The “for the first time”

50

Cf. Boyle, supra note 12 (noting that the broadcasting rights will add to the
already dense “rights thicket” which requires extensive clearance procedures for
utilizing copyrighted works).
51
SCCR/12/2 (Rev. 2), supra note 4, art. 15.
52
See Boyle, supra note 12 (noting that broadcasting rights “could be gained
again and again over the same work, even one on which the copyright term had
lapsed”).
53
See Boyle, supra note 15 (noting that already “[m]any libraries simply refuse
to allow screening of movies until the copyright term has expired” even though
no one would object because “the legal risk is too great”).
54
SCCR/11/3, supra note 3, Explanatory Comment 15.04.
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qualification was removed from the consolidated draft Treaty, however,
because the parties agreed the Treaty is meant to apply to broadcast
“signals” that “by their nature occur only one time.” 55 Even if this
explanation is accepted, it is still incomplete. If the Broadcasting Treaty
protects only broadcast signals without regard to the content of the
broadcast, a given piece of content (again using the example of “The Little
Mermaid”) could be rebroadcast via a different signal and thereby tied up in
a new fifty-year term of protection. 56 After all, how can one distinguish
between two broadcasts with identical content (Ariel, Sebastian and Eric
look exactly the same) but different signals? Potential valid uses of the
“expired” original broadcasts will be chilled because of the difficulty in
distinguishing between the original and the rebroadcast version. Again, the
effect of these deficiencies is to permit broadcasters to lock up content
indefinitely.
¶18
Because the Broadcasting Treaty creates an unlimited term of
copyright-like protection for unoriginal information, it would likely be
unconstitutional if implemented under the Copyright Clause. 57 Thus, the
question becomes whether Congress may nonetheless implement the Treaty
under another of its Article I powers.

II. THE BROADCASTING TREATY AND THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
A. Standing alone, the Commerce Clause seems to provide Congress
with the authority to implement the Broadcasting Treaty.
¶19
After the Copyright Clause, the most likely place for finding
congressional authority to implement the Broadcasting Treaty is under the
Commerce Clause. 58 Copyrights are, after all, limited monopolies meant to
incentivize creation—to “promote the progress” of the useful arts by
securing their value in commerce. 59 And indeed, the Supreme Court has
construed Congress’s commerce power broadly to include the ability to
regulate the channels and instrumentalities of interstate commerce as well as
intrastate activities substantially affecting interstate commerce. 60
¶20
A plainly “interstate” law, the Broadcasting Treaty is meant to
apply “across borders.” 61 It seeks to protect “authors, performers and
producers” from having the legitimate market for their works diminished by

55

Id.
Boyle, supra note 12.
57
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; infra Section II.A.
58
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
59
Id. cl. 8.
60
See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995).
61
SCCR/12/2 (Rev. 2), supra note 4, Preamble.
56
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piracy. 62 This concern about market harms clearly suggests the Treaty’s
intended impact on interstate and international commerce. Indeed, the
difficult question is not whether the Commerce Clause, standing alone,
gives Congress the power to implement the Broadcasting Treaty; it does. 63
The difficult question is whether, in light of the express originality and
“limited times” requirements of the Copyright Clause, 64 Congress may
nevertheless enact the Treaty under the less restrictive Commerce Clause.

B. Considered in context, the Commerce Clause cannot permit
Congress to implement perpetual copyright-like protection for
unoriginal information.
The question of whether Congress may use the Commerce Clause
to implement legislation that would be unconstitutional under the Copyright
Clause has been most debated in the context of the anti-bootlegging statutes.
Because the anti-bootlegging rights are similar to the broadcasting rights,
these cases are instructive in the present analysis of the Broadcasting
Treaty.

¶21

United States v. Moghadam. 65
¶22
The first court to consider whether the Copyright Clause imposes
affirmative limits on other constitutional powers was the Eleventh Circuit in
United States v. Moghadam. 66 The court phrased the issue in the following
manner: “[W]hether Congress can use its Commerce Clause power to avoid
the limitations that might prevent it from passing the same [antibootlegging] legislation under the Copyright Clause.” 67 To answer the
question, the Eleventh Circuit developed two models of constitutional
interpretation. The first, following the reasoning of Heart of Atlanta Motel,
Inc. v. United States, 68 is that “each of the powers of Congress is alternative
to all of the other powers, and what cannot be done under one of them may
very well be doable under another.” 69 The second, following the reasoning
1.

62

See id.; see United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1276 (11th Cir. 1999)
(noting that activities that “depress . . . legitimate markets” by satisfying demand
through “unauthorized channels” are inherently commercial in nature).
63
See Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1282; Kiss Catalog v. Passport Int’l Prods. (Kiss
II), 405 F. Supp. 2d 1169, 1171–73 (C.D. Cal. 2005).
64
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
65
175 F.3d 1269.
66
Id.
67
Id. at 1277.
68
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (discussing
the relationship between congressional power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment and the Commerce Clause).
69
Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1277.
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of Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n v. Gibbons, 70 is that “some of the
grants of legislative authority in Article I, § 8 contain significant
limitations” that should affirmatively prohibit Congress “from passing
certain types of legislation, no matter under which provision.” 71
¶23
Because the Moghadam Court found that the Copyright Clause’s
“fixation requirement” (found in the word “writings”) was stated in
“positive terms” with no express limitations—and because the statute in
question was not “fundamentally inconsistent” with this fixation
requirement—it held that the requirement did not prevent Congress from
enacting copyright-like protections under the Commerce Clause. 72 The
decision left open the question, however, of whether the Copyright Clause’s
more “fundamental” 73 originality and “limited times” requirements—
arguably stated in less “positive terms” with a clearer “negative pregnant”—
could likewise be circumvented.

United States v. Martignon. 74
¶24
United States v. Martignon answered this narrower question in the
negative. 75 Like Moghadam, Martignon involved the constitutionality of an
anti-bootlegging statute, 76 but unlike Moghadam, Martignon explicitly
considered the effect of the Copyright Clause’s “limited times” requirement
on other constitutional powers. 77 This difference proved crucial to the
court’s holding. Adopting Moghadam’s suggestion that legislation
“fundamentally inconsistent” with a requirement of the Copyright Clause
may not be constitutionally passed under the Commerce Clause, 78 the
Martignon court held, “The anti-bootlegging statute’s failure to impose a
durational limitation on its regulation is ‘fundamentally inconsistent’ with
the Copyright Clause’s requirement that copyright-like regulations only
persist for ‘Limited Times.’” 79 In so holding, the court rejected the Heart of
2.

70

Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457, 468–69 (1982)
(discussing conflict between the “uniformity requirement” of the Bankruptcy
Clause and the Commerce Clause).
71
Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1279.
72
Id. at 1280.
73
Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 355 (1991).
(characterizing the originality requirement as “fundamental”); United States v.
Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d 413, 424 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); see also supra Section
II.A–B.
74
346 F. Supp. 2d at 413.
75
Id. at 419.
76
In this case, it was the criminal version of the statute (18 U.S.C. § 2319A
(2000)) at issue.
77
Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 424.
78
United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1280 (11th Cir. 1999).
79
Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 429.
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Atlanta model—that each of Congress’s powers is an alternative to all the
others. 80 Instead, the court distinguished Heart of Atlanta from cases
involving the Copyright Clause because the Fourteenth Amendment (the
authority under which Congress erroneously believed it was acting when
passing the Civil Rights Act at issue in the case), unlike the Copyright
Clause, “is solely an affirmative grant of power—without any express
limitations.” 81
Kiss Catalog v. Passport International Productions (“Kiss I”). 82
¶25
The Martignon decision was followed three months later in Kiss I,
another decision on the constitutionality of the anti-bootlegging
legislation. 83 Following similar reasoning as Martignon, Kiss I held the
civil anti-bootlegging statute unconstitutional as violating the “limited
times” requirements of the Copyright Clause. 84 And, on the more critical
question of whether Congress could still pass the statute under the
Commerce Clause, the court adopted the Railway Labor logic: “[A]llowing
Congress to invoke the Commerce Clause in a situation where the
Copyright Clause would otherwise be violated would ‘eradicate from the
Constitution a limitation on the power of Congress.’” 85
3.

Kiss Catalog v. Passport International Productions (“Kiss II”). 86
¶26
The Kiss I holding was short-lived, however. Upon a motion to
intervene by the United States, Judge Rea, who wrote the opinion in Kiss I,
agreed to reconsider the anti-bootlegging statute’s constitutionality.87 Then,
exactly one year after Judge Rea held the anti-bootlegging statute
unconstitutional in Kiss I, Judge Fischer reached the opposite conclusion in
Kiss II. 88
4.

The holding of Kiss II is twofold. First, the court held that the antibootlegging statue “does not fall within the purview of the Copyright
Clause” and is therefore not subject to that Clause’s limitations. 89 The court
found the anti-bootlegging statue to be outside the ambit of the Copyright
Clause because the law covers subject matter (i.e. live musical
¶27

80

Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1279–80.
Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 428 n.19.
82
350 F. Supp. 2d 823 (C.D. Cal. 2004).
83
Id. The case concerned the civil version of the anti-bootlegging statute (17
U.S.C. § 1101 (2000)).
84
Kiss I, 350 F. Supp. 2d at 836–37.
85
Id. at 837 (quoting Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S.
457, 469 (1982)).
86
405 F. Supp. 2d 1169 (C.D. Cal. 2005).
87
Id. at 1170.
88
Id. at 1176.
89
Id. at 1175.
81
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performances) “not otherwise addressed, prohibited, or protected by the
Copyright Clause.” 90 In the alternative, the court held that even if a
“fundamental conflict” with the Copyright Clause would negate legislation
otherwise sustainable under the Commerce Clause, no such conflict existed
in this case. 91 Because, as noted, the court believed the anti-bootlegging
statue covers subject matter “not previously protected—or protectible—
under the Copyright Clause,” the statute “complements” rather than
conflicts with the Copyright Clause. 92
¶28
In sum, while the majority of these cases suggest that Congress may
not use its commerce power to transcend a fundamental limitation of the
Copyright Clause, the question is far from resolved. In the case of the
Broadcasting Treaty, the conflict between the Copyright and Commerce
Clauses is even more pronounced.

C. Because the Broadcasting Treaty creates perpetual copyright-like
rights over unoriginal information, it cannot be constitutionally
implemented by Congress even under the Commerce Clause.
¶29
Since Kiss II is the only dissenting voice in the anti-bootlegging
cases, its arguments supporting Congress’s ability to implement the
Broadcasting Treaty under the Commerce Clause 93 are worth addressing
first. Kiss II’s holding—essentially that anti-bootlegging rights are not the
stuff of copyright—cannot realistically be read to cover the broadcasting
rights. The broadcasting rights are distinguishable from the antibootlegging rights for several reasons.

In many ways, the broadcasting rights are even closer to falling
within the ambit of copyright than anti-bootlegging rights. First, while
copyrights have never been available for unrecorded live musical
performances, 94 they are available for simultaneously recorded live
¶30

90

Id. at 1176 (“[O]nce the Court concludes that the Statute does not fall within
the purview of the Copyright Clause, it need no longer consider whether it
complies with the limitations of the Copyright Clause. To do so imports into the
Commerce Clause limits that clause does not have. That the Statute might
provide ‘copyright-like’ or ‘copyright-related’ protection to matters clearly not
covered by the Copyright Clause is not important. One need only find an
alternative source of constitutional authority.”).
91
Id.
92
Id.
93
Id.
94
Id. (noting that the anti-bootlegging statute “proscribes conduct not otherwise
addressed . . . by the Copyright Clause: the non-consensual recording of a live
performance”).
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broadcasts. 95 Indeed, Congress recently adopted a statute specifically
intended to permit copyright protection for such broadcasts. 96 Thus, while
anti-bootlegging rights may not be “otherwise addressed, prohibited, or
protected by the Copyright Clause,” 97 broadcasting rights clearly are. A
broadcaster can obtain a copyright over his creation (the content, not the
signal) by simply recording (i.e. “fixing”) the broadcast (as, for example,
the National Basketball Association does when it broadcasts its games). 98
Second, the substantive protections afforded to broadcasters by the
Treaty 99 are nearly identical to the protections granted to copyright holders
by the Copyright Act. 100 Both secure the exclusive rights of reproduction,
distribution, and transmission of the work. 101 Like traditional property
rights, these rights all make information excludable, the very essence of
“intellectual property.” 102
¶31

Third, the same policy underlies both copyrights and broadcasting
rights. Both rights seek to increase the amount and quality of works of
authorship by incentivizing investment in content production.103 Similar to
copyright protection, the Broadcasting Treaty grants to the broadcaster an
exclusive right to his creation and protection against copying and piracy to
encourage production and dissemination. 104
¶32

¶33
There is also an important difference between the anti-bootlegging
and broadcasting rights. Unlike the anti-bootlegging rights, which were
created by Congress in the first instance, the broadcasting rights were
created by an international body (WIPO). Thus, while there may be a
“presumption of constitutionality” 105 when Congress actually creates the
95

See Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, 105 F.3d 841, 847 (2d Cir. 1997)
(noting that “recorded broadcasts of NBA games . . . are now entitled to
copyright protection”); Boyle, supra note 12 (noting that broadcasting rights
cover “works that are at the heart of copyright, indeed which might themselves
be copyrighted by their authors”).
96
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
97
Kiss II, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 1176.
98
See generally Motorola, 105 F.3d 841.
99
See SCCR/12/2 (Rev. 2), supra note 4, arts. 6–13.
100
See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106–106A.
101
Id.; SCCR/12/2 (Rev. 2), supra note 4.
102
See United States v. Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d 413, 421 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
103
Compare Edward C. Walterscheid, To Promote the Progress of Science and
Useful Arts: The Background and Origin of the Intellectual Property Clause of
the United States Constitution, 2 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1 (1994) with SCCR/1/9,
Report (Nov. 10, 1998), available at
http://www.wipo.int/documents/en/meetings/1998/sccr_98/pdf/1_9.pdf.
104
See SCCR/1/9, Report at ¶ 175.
105
Kiss Catalog v. Passport Int’l Prods. (Kiss II), 405 F. Supp. 2d 1169, 1172
(C.D. Cal. 2005).
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rights at issue, the presumption seems inapposite where Congress is merely
implementing rights created by an international body less familiar with the
nuances of U.S. copyright law.
In considering the similarities between copyrights and broadcasting
rights, it seems disingenuous to argue that the broadcasting rights are not
the stuff of copyright—that they somehow fall outside the purview of the
Copyright Clause. To the contrary, the broadcasting rights are copyrights,
both in their terms and in their intended effect. As such, these rights should
be implemented only under the Copyright Clause. Indeed, as one scholar
has concluded, “Commerce Clause legislation that vests property rights in
information decreases the amount and type of information freely available
as surely as when Congress legislates under the Copyright Clause.” 106

¶34

More generally, the logic of Kiss II represents one of two opposite
constructions of the Constitution. The Kiss II Court conceived of the
Constitution as “a series of hermetically sealed provisions.” 107 Once the
court found congressional authority under the broad Commerce Clause, its
analysis was essentially over. 108 To the extent that the other enumerated
powers do not affirmatively limit congressional power, this construction is
not especially problematic. 109 But, where the other enumerated powers
contain limitations (like the “limited times” limitation of the Copyright
Clause or the uniformity limitation of the Bankruptcy Clause) the danger of
eradicating these limitations from the Constitution is great. 110 This danger
is exacerbated by the Supreme Court’s broad reading of the commerce
power. 111 If permitted to do so, the clause, covering nearly all activities
even tangentially related to commerce, would subsume express limitations
on more specific commercial acts. 112
¶35

106

William Patry, The Enumerated Powers Doctrine and Intellectual Property:
An Imminent Constitutional Collision, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 359, 371 (1999).
107
Kiss II, 405 F. Supp. 2d 1169, 1172.
108
See id. at 1172–73. While the court did go on to consider the statute under
the Copyright Clause, it noted that this step was “not necessarily mandated.” Id.
at 1173.
109
Picture a Venn diagram where the Copyright Clause circle is entirely
encompassed by the broader Commerce Clause circle. Any action taken within
the Copyright Clause circle is also permissible under the larger Commerce
Clause circle.
110
Now picture a Venn diagram where part of the Copyright Clause circle (the
originality and “limited times” portions) falls outside of the Commerce Clause
circle. Action taken in this outlying part of the Copyright Clause circle would
not be permissible under the Commerce Clause circle.
111
See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 566 (1995).
112
See id. at 589 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“Much if not all of Art. I, § 8
(including portions of the Commerce Clause itself) would be surplusage if
Congress had been given authority over matters that substantially affect
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A more appropriate conception of the Constitution is to see it as an
integrated document; a limitation in one part of the document may well
proscribe action pursuant to another part of the document. This view is well
summarized by Harvard Law Professor Laurence Tribe: “Read in isolation,
most of the Constitution’s provisions make only a highly limited kind of
sense. Only as an interconnected whole do these provisions meaningfully
constitute a frame of government.” 113 In other words, the Constitution is a
package deal.
¶36

¶37
Viewed as a whole, each of the congressional powers in Article I,
Section 8 should not be seen as occupying the same plane of specification.
The Commerce Clause is a general grant of authority while the Copyright
Clause is a more specific application of that general authority. 114
Copyrights affect commerce, but they affect commerce in specific ways
with specific consequences and are therefore handled in more detail in the
Copyright Clause. To gloss over this detail and summarily conclude that
copyright-like legislation is at its heart commercial legislation (and
therefore permissible under the Commerce Clause) is to render a good
portion of Article I, Section 8 surplusage. 115 The Supreme Court rejected
this result as early as Marbury v. Madison when Chief Justice Marshall
famously announced, “It cannot be presumed that any clause in the
constitution is intended to be without effect; and therefore such a
construction is inadmissible, unless the words require it.” 116 In short,
instead of viewing the Copyright Clause and the Commerce Clause as
parallel and co-equal grants of power, 117 it is more in keeping with the goals
of each provision to view the Copyright Clause as a subset of the general
Commerce Clause power.

interstate commerce. An interpretation of cl. 3 that makes the rest of § 8
superfluous simply cannot be correct. Yet this Court’s Commerce Clause
jurisprudence has endorsed just such an interpretation: the power we have
accorded Congress has swallowed Art. I, § 8.”).
113
Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on FreeForm Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221, 1235
(1995).
114
See William W. Van Alstyne, Reconciling What the First Amendment
Forbids with What the Copyright Clause Permits, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
225, 226 (2003) (describing the Copyright Clause as a “very specific,
enumerated power” and a “specifically targeted clause”).
115
See Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457, 469 (1982);
Kiss Catalog v. Passport Int’l Prods. (Kiss I), 350 F. Supp. 2d 823, 837 (C.D.
Cal. 2004).
116
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 167 (1803).
117
E.g., Kiss Catalog v. Passport Int’l Prods. (Kiss II), 405 F. Supp. 2d 1169,
1175 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (discussing the “separate, co-equal character of
constitutional grants” (quoting 1 RAYMOND T. NIMMER, INFORMATION LAW
§ 6:30 (2005))).
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If properly constructed to recognize both grants and limitations of
power, the Constitution leaves little room for the implementation of the
Broadcasting Treaty. An honest evaluation of the broadcasting rights
reveals that they are nearly indistinguishable from copyrights in almost
every respect. The broadcasting rights do differ, however, in two crucial
respects—they protect unoriginal information and are perpetual. These
differences place the Broadcasting Treaty beyond Congress’s copyright
authority and ought to place it beyond Congress’s commerce authority as
well.

¶38

118

CONCLUSION
¶39
Both on its face, and in effect, the Broadcasting Treaty creates
rights over information closely analogous to copyrights. By allowing
broadcasters to acquire rights over unoriginal broadcast signals, and to
acquire a new term of protection over the same content by simply rebroadcasting, the Treaty violates the originality and “limited times”
requirements of the Copyright Clause. 119 Because the Treaty would violate
fundamental limitations of the Copyright Clause (the clause under which the
Treaty would be most properly enacted) Congress should be forbidden from
enacting the Treaty under the less restrictive Commerce Clause. While the
Copyright Clause may appear to be solely a grant of power, it must be read
to have limitations. 120
¶40
As Justice Marshall stated, “Affirmative words are often, in their
operation, negative of other objects than those affirmed; and in this case, a
negative or exclusive sense must be given to them or they have not
operation at all.” 121 To construe the Copyright Clause as a self-contained
affirmative grant of power is to give certain words in the Clause no
operation at all.

118

Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 212 (2003) (quoting Graham v. John Deere
Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1966)).
119
U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8.
120
Eldred, 537 U.S. at 212; United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1280
(11th Cir. 1999).
121
Marbury, 5 U.S. at 167.
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